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THE FAITH AND MORALS OF
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA
DAVID F. FORTE*

Both admirers and cntlcs call Antonin Scalia the most
influential Supreme Court justice in the last half century. 1 He made
originalism 2 a legitimate tool of analysis for previously recalcitrant
justices. 3 Today, originalism is the stuff of the advocate's brief. 4
Antonin Scalia schooled his colleagues in the art of textual analysis, 5

* Professor of Law, Cleveland State University Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law; B.A., Harvard College; M.A., University of Manchester; J.D., Columbia
University; Ph.D., University of Toronto. I am grateful for the advice of Dr. Michael
Uhlmann and for the assistance ofthe staff ofthe Cleveland-Marshall School of Law
Library. The conclusions are the author's.
1
Jeffry Rosen, What Made Antonin Scalia Great, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 12,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/20 l 6/02/what-made-antonin
scalia-great/462837; George Weigel, After Justice Scalia, FIRST THINGS (Feb. 24,
2016), https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2016/02/after-justice-scalia.
2
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 854
(1989) ("Central to that analysis [John Marshall's defense of judicial review in
Marbury v. Madison], it seems to me, is the perception that the Constitution, though
it has an effect superior to other laws, is in its nature the sort of 'law' that is the
business of the courts-an enactment that has a fixed meaning ascertainable through
the usual devices familiar to those learned in the law") [hereinafter Originalism]. In
other words, all that originalism requires is a standard method of statutory
interpretation (as opposed to common-law interpretation) that lawyers in the Anglo
American tradition have long been expert in. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997).
3
See, e.g., Justice John Paul Stevens' opinions in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) and District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
636 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Hugo Black has been termed a "liberal
originalist," though it would seem more accurate to call him a "liberal textualist."
Cass R. Sunstein, Originalism for Liberals, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 28, 1998),
https://newrepublic.com/article/64084/originalism-liberals (reviewing Akil Reed
Amar, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1998), and Akhil Reed Amar & Alan Hirsch, FOR THE
PEOPLE (1998)).
4
Adam Winkler, Originalism: It's not just for conservatives anymore,
SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/08/originalism-its
not-just-for-conservatives-anymore/.
5
See generally Jonathan R. Siegel, The Legacy of Justice Scalia and His
Textualist Ideal, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857 (2017).
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and today, justices gloss a text as never before. 6 "Justice Scalia's
powerful arguments for originalism and textualism changed the way
all justices, liberal and conservative, approached cases," declared
Professor Aziz Huq of the University of Chicago Law School. 7 And
he over and again called his colleagues to task for exceeding their
mandate. What lay behind the singular influence of this man-an
influence made more by his dissents than his majority opinions?
Not since Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. has a justice's
contrariness figured so much in the development of constitutional law.
Both Holmes and Scalia thought that judges ought to get out of the
way of the other branches of government-Holmes because his
skepticism led him to think judges were not capable of making
decisions on great social issues, 8 Scalia because he thought the
Constitution did not give him the right to make such decisions in the
first place. 9
How did it come to be that the skeptic and the religious
adherent were so close? Both men were intellectuals, experts in
common law reasoning, 10 scions of their families, sons of respected
men of letters. Both were prodded to success by demanding
accomplished fathers. 11 Both found their voice in ringing dissents.
6

See, e.g., Justice Elena Kagan's opinion in Advocate Health Care Network v.
Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017), and Justice Neil Gorsuch's opinion in Henson v.
Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017). The contending opinions
of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan in case of Lockhart v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 938
(2016), fought over the application of the "rule of the last antecedent" to a three
word phrase in a federal criminal statute.
7
Jeremy Manier, Antonin Scalia, Supreme Court justice andformer UChicago
law professor, 1936-2016, UCHICAGO NEWS, https://news.uchicago.edu/
storyI antonin-scalia -supreme-court-justice-and-former-uchicago-law-professor
l 936-2016.
8
David F. Forte, The Making of the Modern Supreme Court: Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., and Louis D. Brandeis, in HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT
602, 607 (Bryan-Paul Frost & Jeffrey Sikkenga eds., 2d ed. 2019).
9
ANTONIN SCALIA, SCALIA SPEAKS: REFLECTIONS ON LAW, FAITH AND LIFE
WELL LIVED 169-75 (Christopher Scalia, & Edward Whelan eds., 2017).
10
See generally OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881);
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS (2012).
11
Holmes' father, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., was a celebrated essayist. G.
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Both crafted quotable aphorisms. Both had circles of close friends.
Both excited adulation. Both incurred enmity.
Yet Holmes was a relativist, while Scalia thought that reason
could reach the truth. Holmes believed that religion was so much
superstition. Scalia believed that religion pointed to a transcendent
reality. Holmes was diffident. Scalia impertinent. Holmes was a
Boston Brahmin from Beacon Hill. Scalia was an Italian kid who
grew up in Queens.
But they shared much. For one thing, Holmes and Scalia took
a puckish delight in upholding laws they never would have otherwise
supported. Holmes once wrote: "It has given me great pleasure to
sustain the Constitutionality of laws that I believe to be as bad as
possible." 12 Scalia famously declared: "If it were up to me, I would
put in jail every sandal-wearing, scruffy-bearded weirdo who bums
the American flag. But I am not king." 13 Yet Scalia was certain that
the First Amendment protects the kind of contempt for the government
and its symbols that flag burning represents. 14
We can easily understand how the free-thinking Holmes would
be suspicious of judges who strayed off into popular social and
economic theory. He was equally disdainful of progressives and
laissez faire apologists. 15 But what of Scalia? How could a man who
had utter confidence in the reality of absolute truth find himself on the
same ground as the skeptical Holmes?
The puzzle is deepened when we see that Scalia actually shared
Holmes' historicist view of the common law. In 1881, when Holmes
published his seminal work, The Common Law, he penned a phrase in

EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 9
14 (1993). Scalia's father was a respected Professor of Romance Languages. JOAN
BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 13-17 (2009).
12
LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 67 (2001 ).
13
Antonin Scalia Explains Why Americans Can Burn the Flag, HEAVY.COM
(Nov. 29, 2016), https://heavy.com/news/2016/11/watch-antonin-scalia-flag
burning-donald-trump-video-justice-say-about-first-amendment-freedom-of-speec
h.
14
ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 9, at 207.
15
G. EDWARD WHITE, supra note 10, at 320.
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its opening paragraph that has likely been the most oft-quoted
aphorism in American legal language: "The life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience." He furthered developed his thesis:
The felt necessities ofthe time, the prevalent moral and
political theories, institutions of public policy, avowed
or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share
with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do
than the syllogism in determining the rules by which
men should be govemed. 16
One might think that Holmes' view that the law must adapt to "the felt
necessities of the time" was precisely what was anathema to Scalia,
more especially because Holmes has often been credited with being
the progenitor of the School of Legal Realism, a view of the law that
Scalia could not abide by. 17
Nonetheless, in truth, Scalia accepted the Holmesian view of
the common law-that it was, in fact, law created by judges. Scalia
declared, "The common law is judge-made law, crafted and refined by
judges over time to fit the needs of a changing and developing
society." 18 Scalia could have embraced a pre-Holmesian notion of
the common law, for until Holmes, even though they repaired to
experience, judges nonetheless still saw law as a "given," and they
believed that they were interpreting it within a larger framework. That
overarching framework was, as has been famously noted, part of a
"higher law" tradition, including, to some degree, an appreciation of
the natural law within. 19 But both Holmes and Scalia derided the
natural law. In 1915, Holmes wrote an essay that constituted a frontal
attack on the tradition from the avowed perspective of skepticism. For
Holmes, one's preferences were the only touchstone of reality.
Natural lawyers, he argued, were "in that nai've state of mind that
16

HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881 ).
At Harvard Law School, Scalia was exposed to a movement that disdained
Legal Realism in favor of "legal process" and neutral principles oflaw." RICHARD
A BRISBAIN, JR., JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL 14
15 (1997).
18
ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 9, at 174 (emphasis in original).
19
See generally EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW "BACKGROUND OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ( 1971 ).
17
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accepts which has been familiar and accepted by them and their
neighbors as something that must be accepted by all men
everywhere." 20
But here also, Scalia was at one with Holmes. He too
disdained the natural law. Although Hadley Arkes has detected
natural law underpinnings in Scalia's reasoning, 21 Scalia himself
claimed to have no truck with the system of natural law, at least as a
grounding for making judicial decisions. No matter how objective
natural law might be, Scalia, like Justice Hugo Black before him,
thought that in the hands of judges, "natural law" would be but an
excuse for interposing one's subjective policy preferences into the
law. As Black put it in Adamson v. California: 22 "This decision
reasserts a constitutional theory ... that this Court is endowed by the
Constitution with boundless power under 'natural law' periodically to
expand and contract constitutional standards to conform to the Court's
conception of what at a particular time constitutes 'civilized decency'
and 'fundamental liberty and justice. "' 23 Similarly, Justice Scalia
wrote: "Do you really want judges-fallible judges-going about
enforcing their vision of natural law, contrary to the dictates of
democratically enacted positive law? Lord, no." 24 For Scalia, a
discretionary approach to judging, whether it be the natural law or the
common law, was inappropriate for an appellate court, at least for a
court at the highest constitutional level. For Scalia, the nature of

20

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE
HOLMES 446 (Sheldon Novick ed. 1995).
21
Hadley Arkes, The SelfMade Trap, CLAREMONT.0RG (Fed. 23, 2016),
https ://www.claremont.org/crb/article/the-self-made-trap ("Was Scalia revealing,
yet again, that he had been "speaking prose" all his life-that he had been offering
us handsome examples of natural law reasoning for many years, while insisting to
us that it couldn't be done?"); Hadley Arkes, Antonin Scalia: A Spirited Life in the
Law, NATIONAL REVIEW (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.nationalreview.
com/2016/02/antonin-scalias-jurisprudence ("Scalia was a relentless logician, and
as he sought the logic behind the text he would persistently find himself reasoning
back to those principles that were not in the text").
22
332 U.S. 46 (1947).
23
Id. at 69 (Black, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
24
ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 9, at 248.
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law-at least, statutory law and constitutional law-was positivistic. 25
Its validity derived from the will of the democratic electorate.
As Justice Scalia would not have the judge be a philosopher of
natural law, still less would he want a judge to be a historian of natural
law. History (and he attacked the use of legislative history in
particular)26 was as capable of being manipulated to affirm a judge's
prejudices as was philosophy. 27 Even when Scalia was forced to have
recourse to history, in order to discern a constitutional principle, he
did so on the most narrow possible grounds. In Michael H. v. Gerald
D.,2 8 the Supreme Court had to decide whether to uphold California's
presumption that the husband (Gerald D.) of a married woman who
had given birth was the father of the child against the claim of the
woman's lover (Michael H.) that he was a biological father. The lover
claimed a due process liberty interest in visitation rights to the child.
Following precedent that required that a liberty interest be one that is
"traditionally protected by our society," 29 Scalia found for the
husband. He determined that there was no such historical liberty
interest in the lover's claim, but that, on the contrary, the presumption
of the husband's paternity is part of "[t]he historic respect -- indeed,
sanctity would not be too strong a term -- traditionally accorded to the
relationships that develop within the unitary family." 30 In a
controversial footnote, Scalia argued that when the Court must resort
to history to inform its decision, it must consult "the most specific
tradition available." "[G]eneral traditions," on the other hand, he
wrote, "provide such imprecise guidance, [that] they permit judges to
dictate rather than discern the society's views." 31
25

See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1175 (1989). See also Beau J. Brock, Mr. Justice Antonin Scalia: A
Renaissance ofPositivism and Predictability in Constitutional Adjudication, 51 LA.
L. REV. 623 (1991). George Kannar terms Scalia's approach a "profoundly
positivist and textualist vision." George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of
Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L. J. 1297, 1307 (1990).
26
ANTONIN SCALIA SPEAKS, supra note 9, at 236-42.
27
Originalism, supra note 2, at 864.
28
491 U.S. 110 (1989).
29
Id. at 122.
30
Id. at 123.
31
Id. at 127 (n. 6). Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Brennan took issue with
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It is because of Justice Scalia's suspicion of philosophy and of

history that he becomes an outspoken textualist. 32 But why should
text carry greater authority? Why should the written word, rather than
evolving tradition, be of higher authority, particularly to a Roman
Catholic?
To understand Antonin Scalia's affirmation of the
centrality of text, we must, as many already have, seek to find out how
the man viewed his religion and how he practiced it.
II

Antonin Scalia was neither the first, nor the last, Catholic
appointed to the Supreme Court, but he was the most outspoken about
his faith off the bench. Many observers have, in fact, remarked on
the man's Catholicism, but often with inaccurate reductionism. For
example, in his critical biography, Bruce Alan Murphy repeatedly
declares that Scalia was part of "the new Catholic majority" that was
able to exert its influence on constitutional law beginning in 2007,
because of the shared religious beliefs of the five of its members. 33
When Professor Geoffrey Stone of the University of Chicago Law
School (and former faculty colleague ofScalia's) made the same claim
that it had been the religion of the Catholic majority that had decided
the partial birth abortion case, 34 Scalia was so outraged at Stone that

Scalia's narrow methodology.
32
Even though Justice Scalia agreed with Justice Black's distrust of natural
law reasoning, Scalia believed that Black was an inadequate textualist. Black had
thought that the First Amendment's phrasing that began "Congress shall pass no
law" was an absolute prohibition on any legislation that restricted freedom of speech.
But Scalia emphasized that the First Amendment does not say that government shall
not abridge freedom of speech. It says that government shall not abridge 'THE
freedom of speech'-that is, that freedom of speech which was the understood right
of Englishmen." ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 9, at 203-04 (emphasis in original).
And Black, Scalia declared, never did any work to find out what the historic meaning
of the phrase actually was. Id. at 205.
33
BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, SCALIA: A COURT OF ONE 361-63 (2015).
34
Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). Geoffrey R. Stone, Stone on
Based
Justices,
LAW.UCHICAGO.EDU
(April
30,
2007),
Faith
https ://www.law. uchicago. edu/news/stone-faith-based-justices.
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he exclaimed, "Now, he knows that's a damn lie." 35 Scalia pledged,
"I will not appear at the University of Chicago until he is no longer on
the faculty." 36 Later, Scalia and Stone reconciled, and in 2012, Scalia
gave a well-received lecture at the University of Chicago Law School.
Shortly before he died, Scalia wrote Stone a note thanking him, when
Stone had publicly defended Scalia on another controversial matter. 37
Murphy's and Stone's view-and they are not the only
ones 38-comes from equating Catholicism with a political ideology.
It is a perspective, once Protestant 39 and now secular, 40 that has
distorted American views of Catholicism for over two centuries. 41
Scalia always took the deepest personal umbrage at charges that he
was a results-oriented judge, and a Catholic results-oriented judge to
boot. He asserted that an "evolving constitutionalist" would utilize his
personal views, including his religious views, to guide his
interpretation. But a textualist (like Scalia) tries to keep himself
immune from such temptations. 42
Many other observers have said that Scalia was a

35

JOAN BISKUPIC, supra note 11, 204.
Id.
37
Stone stated: "Two months ago, after he made some controversial comments
from the bench during oral argument in an affirmative action case, I wrote an op-ed
defending his questioning. He very graciously emailed me to thank me. That was,
sadly, my last personal contact with him." Geoffrey R. Stone, Tough, Brilliant, and
Kind: The Antonin Scalia 1 Knew, DAILY BEAST, February 14, 2016,
https://www.thedailybeast.com/tough-brilliant-and-kind-the-antonin-scalia-i-knew.
38
As an example, Senators Mazie Hirono and Kamala Harris have recently
questioned the objectivity of a nominee to the federal bench because he is a member
of the Knights of Columbus. Ed Condon, Judicial nominee faces Senate scrutiny
over Knights ofColumbus membership, CATHOLIC NEWS SERVICE (Dec. 21, 2018),
https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/senators-quiz-nominee-about-member
ship-of-extreme-knights-of-columbus-78683.
39
See, e.g., LYMAN BEECHER, A PLEA FOR THE WEST (1835).
40
See, e.g., PAUL BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER
(1949).
41
Phillip Hamburger, A Dismal Tradition, FIRST THINGS (Jan. 11, 2019),
https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2019/0 l/a-dismal-tradition; Sanford
Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics
Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAULL. REV. 1047 (1990).
42
JOAN BISKUPIC, supra note 11, at 209.
36
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"conservative Catholic" or a pre-Vatican II Catholic, and that explains
him. 43 George Kannar, for example, attempts to solve the riddle of
why a Catholic judge, rather than a Protestant judge, should be so
beholden to the text. Kannar traces Scalia's "sola scriptura" attitude
to being a pre-Vatican II Catholic, subject to the literalism of The
Baltimore Catechism. 44 Although Kannar understands the religious
culture in which Scalia was raised and which he embraced, others
doubt that the pre-Vatican Catholic culture was what made him so
insistent on text and originalism. Donald J. Beschle, for example,
points out that Catholic justices, like Frank Murphy, were raised in the
same milieu and were equally beholden to their faith, but had a far
different interpretive mien. 45
What Kannar and Beschle and others do understand, however,
was the passionate devotion Antonin Scalia had for his faith. Antonin
Scalia was a truly devout Catholic-not a cafeteria Catholic, not a
Christmas and Easter Catholic, not even a once a week Sunday
Catholic. And, for Scalia, to be a devout Catholic makes one neither
a conservative nor a liberal. That is why he objected so vehemently
to those who charged that he was importing either political or religious
policy positions into his judging. And why he was embarrassed when
opponents of abortion commended him on his stand:
I must tell them that I deserve no thanks; that my
position is not a virtuous affirmation of my religious
belief, or even a sagacious policy choice, but simply
the product of lawyerly analysis of constitutional text
and tradition; and that if legal analysis had produced
the opposite conclusion I would have come out the
opposite way, regardless of their or my views

43

Murphy is typical: "Indeed, for Scalia, there were strong similarities between
the literal reading of biblical text and the use of historical sources to interpret
Scripture in the pre-Vatican II Catholic faith, and the historically based dictionary
technique for interpreting the Constitution in his originalist/textualist philosophy."
BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, supra note 33, at 366.
44
Kannar, supra note 25, at 1313.
45
See generally Donald J. Beschle, Catechism or Imagination: Is Justice
Scalia 's Judicial Style Typically Catholic?, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1329 (1992).
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concerning abortion. 46

III
So let us enquire what part or parts of Scalia's Catholicism
might have accounted for his particular style of judging and why he
believed that originalism and textualism were morally required of
judges. We can say that the fundamental elements that constitute
Catholicism are beliefs (doctrines and dogmas), devotions (including
prayers and the sacraments), moral imperatives (which include good
works and vocation), and Church (hierarchical authority). The last,
the hierarchical authority of the Church, defines beliefs, administers
devotions, and teaches morality. That function ofthe Church is termed
its Magisterium, or teaching office. 47 The Catholic Catechism
describes the Magisterium as,
The task of giving an authentic interpretation of the
Word of God, whether in its written form or in the form
of Tradition, has been entrusted to the living office of
the Church alone. Its authority in this matter is
exercised in the name of Jesus Christ. This means that
the task of interpretation has been entrusted to the
bishops in communion with the successor of Peter, the
Bishop ofRome. 48
It is the glue that holds this temporal institution, its mission,
and its adherents together.
For a devout Catholic, to live one's religion means: (1) fidelity
to the Magisterium; (2) worship and prayer; (3) constant introspection,
meditation, and self-evaluation; (4) moral living and the practice of
charity; and (5) a commitment to a unique vocation. Ifwe can see how
Antonin Scalia approached each of those elements ofhis faith, we may
46

ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 9, at 152.
See generally AVERY DULLES, MAGISTERIUM: TEACHER AND GUARDIAN OF
THE FAITH (2010).
48
Catechism of the Catholic Church, Pt. I. Sec. 1, ch. 2, art. 3, par. 85,
VATICAN.VA, http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_PM.HTM#84 (last visited
March 29, 2019) [hereinafter Cathechism].
47
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be able to discern why he was such a passionate apologist for
originalist textualism.
In his early childhood years, Antonin Scalia's parents enrolled
him in public school in Queens. But at Xavier High School in lower
Manhattan, he received a thorough Jesuit Catholic education. He
excelled and graduated as valedictorian. All agree that the rigor of the
place profoundly affected Scalia. His religious devotions were
extensive; his Catholic identity prominent to those around him. 49
He went on to Georgetown University, which was not then the
secular clone it was later criticized as becoming. In the 1950s,
Georgetown was a conservative Jesuit Catholic institution. Here too,
Scalia's Catholic faith remained strong. Here too, he triumphed
scholastically and became valedictorian. He majored in history,
though he was later to become suspicious of historical research as a
guide to determining what a legal rule should be. He had become
very self-confident, but at his oral comprehensive exams, he was given
a dose of humility. After answering a number of questions with skill
and competence, he later recalled, the examiner said, "'Very good, Mr.
Scalia. I have one last question: If you look back over all the history
that you've studied here over the last four years, if you had to pick one
event that you thought was the most significant, what would it be?"'
Scalia could not recall what he answered in response, but he did
remember his questioner's reaction. "[H]e shook his head sadly and
said, 'No, Mr. Scalia. The Incarnation, Mr. Scalia."' The lesson that
Scalia said he learned from this encounter: "[N]ot to separate your
religious life from your intellectual life." 50
One would think that the product of such an education would
have a particular loyalty to the Magisterium and to authorities that the
Church holds up as exemplary. During his time on the Supreme
Court, Scalia spoke frequently before university chapters of the St.
Thomas More Society (he had been a member while at Georgetown),
and at these talks, he repeatedly affirmed a strong confession of faith.
He took the lesson given him at his comprehensive finals to preach a
humble acceptance of faith, even though fidelity to the tenets of
49

JOAN BISKUPIC,

50

Id. at 25.

supra note 11, at 21-22.
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Christianity inevitably makes one an outcast, a simpleton, in the eyes
of the secular elites.
To believe, first and foremost, that Jesus Christ was God.
(Why the notion that the Creator should become a bull is as
unsophisticated as the notion that Zeus should become a bull.) Or to
believe that he was born of a virgin. (Well, I mean, Really!) That he
actually, physically, rose from the grave. That he founded a church
with the power to bind and loose-to pronounce, authoritatively, the
will of God for mankind. That, as he taught, hardship and suffering
are not to be avoided at all costs but are to be embraced and indeed
even sought after-as penance for sin, and as a means of sharing in
the crucifixion of Christ. (How utterly ridiculous to forego legitimate
pleasures and to seek discomfort! How absurd the vow and chastity
and the hair shirt!) Or the belief in miracles as at Lourdes and Fatima.
Or, finally, the belief that those who love God and obey his commands
will rise from the dead, in their bodies, and be happy with him forever
in heaven; and that those who do not will burn in hell. 51
True to his prediction, his witness was widely castigated by
52
critics, but that did not dissuade him from repeating his attachment
to his beliefs before other audiences. 53 One friend said of him, "I
think his faithful belief in Catholic doctrine is what makes him run. I
think he is a true believer." 54
His outspokenness was a product of his personality, his
intelligence, and his upbringing. But it was also clearly a product of
his faith. While at Georgetown University, he spent his junior abroad
in Switzerland. He reported, "On the way back home, I spent some
time in England, and I remember going to Hyde Park Corner. And
there was a Roman Catholic priest in his collar, standing on a soapbox,
preaching the Catholic faith and being heckled by a group. And I
thought, My goodness. I thought that was admirable. I have often
bemoaned the fact that the Catholic Church has sort of lost that
51

ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 9, at 108.
Michael Stokes Paulsen & Steffen N. Johnson, Scalia 's Sermonette, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 863, 864-65 (1997).
53
See, for example, his talk before The Judicial Prayer Breakfast Group.
ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 9, at 117.
54
JOAN BISKUPIC, supra note 11, at 187.
52
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evangelistic spirit." 55 In that sense he was at one with the call for a
"new evangelization" 56 of the recent popes despite his public
disagreement with them on the issue of capital punishment.
One should have expected that Scalia's witness to the tenets of
Christian Catholicism would also make him a follower of other
authoritative sources of the Church's teachings, such as papal
pronouncements or figures such as St. Thomas Aquinas. But Scalia's
affirmation of the Church's Magisterium did not mean that he always
accepted the hierarchy's interpretation of the corpus of the
Magisterium, even when that hierarchy included the Pope. The rigor
of his education had actually equipped him to contest authoritative
figures in the Church. In some ways, Antonin Scalia was more
Catholic than the Pope-literally. He famously contested Pope St.
John Paul II's stand on capital punishment. In his encyclical,
Evangelium Vitae, the Pope had stated in regard to the death penalty,
It is clear that, for these purposes to be achieved, the
nature and extent of the punishment must be carefully
evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the
extreme of executing the offender except in cases of
absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not
be possible otherwise to defend society. Today
however, as a result of steady improvements in the
organization of the penal system, such cases are very
rare, if not practically non-existent. 57
The Catechism of the Catholic Church, published in 1992, had
evinced a similarly limited accepted of the death penalty.
Assuming that the guilty party's identity and responsibility
have been fully determined, the traditional teaching of the Church
does not exclude recourse to the death penalty, if this is the only
possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust
55
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aggressor. 58
But Antonin Scalia was not persuaded. In fact, he thought that
the Pope was flat out wrong, and even quoted St. Paul against him. 59
Restating what has been the traditional Catholic position on the
authority of the Pope, Scalia declared:
I am therefore happy to learn from the canonical
experts I have consulted that the position set forth in
Evangelium Vitae and in the latest version of the
Catholic catechism does not purport to be binding
teaching-that is, it need not be accepted by practicing
Catholics, though they must give it thoughtful and
respectful consideration ... So I have given this new
position thoughtful and careful consideration-and I
disagree. 60
Scalia defended his position that capital punishment was "not
immoral" because punishment as a just retribution for immoral actions
is not only divinely sanctioned (Christ's atonement for sins against
God is the "type" that authorizes the moral validity of retributive
capital punishment by those in political authority) but retribution for
moral harms is also the (natural?) understanding of people in
general. 61
Conservative churchmen of respected authority such as Avery
Dulles and Bishop Charles J. Chaput) defended the change in the
Pope's teaching and retorted sharply to Scalia. 62 Bishop Chaput went
so far as to equate Scalia's dissention from the newly articulated
teaching on capital punishment with Catholics who dissent from the
Church's teaching on abortion. 63 Subsequently Pope Francis has
58
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revised the Catechism even further to state that use ofthe death penalty
is now "inadmissible."64 One might think that, were Justice Scalia still
alive, he would continue his disagreement with the man who sits in
the Chair of Peter. On the other hand, when Scalia was asked about
Pope Francis's views (Francis became Pope eleven months before
Scalia's death), Scalia answered, "He's the Vicar of Christ. He's the
chief. I don't run down the pope." 65
Not only was Scalia unafraid to contest the successor to Saint
Peter, but, as we shall see below, he had no hesitation to dispute St.
Thomas Aquinas. Thus, to those who define Scalia simply as a pre
Vatican II Catholic, he certainly did not fit the stereotype as an
uncompromising follower of papal or even Thomistic authority.
What of the other elements of the man's Catholicity? Antonin
Scalia was certainly a worshipful and prayerful man. He frequently
attended daily Mass, and often sat quietly afterwards doing his
spiritual reading for the day. At his funeral Mass, his son, Father Paul
Scalia, said ofhim, "He treasured the Church's ceremonies, especially
the beauty of her ancient worship. He trusted the power of the
Sacraments as the means of salvation-as Christ working within him
for his salvation." 66
The "ancient worship" that Father Scalia was referring to was
the Latin Mass. Antonin Scalia would travel far to be able to attend
a Latin Mass, as was available at St. Matthew's Cathedral in
Washington, or even the older Tridentine rite observed at parish
churches. He had a number of face-to-face disputes with priests,
whether it be a "smart-ass young Jesuit" or "some crazy Dominicans,"
who had either belittled Catholic doctrine from the pulpit, or
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bowdlerized the Mass from the altar. 67 In a speech to the Knights of
Columbus, he praised "'traditional Catholics' who say the Rosary, go
on pilgrimages, kneel during the Eucharist, and 'follow religiously the
teachings of the Pope."'68 Commenting on Scalia's love of traditional
architecture and worship in the Church, Leonard Leo concluded,
"What those outward manifestations allow him to do is to focus on
faith and to achieve a level of spirituality." 69 That faith included
frequent retreats ("Any person who believes in the transcendental has
to go on a retreat periodically"), 70 and when he could, Mass during the
week.
These faithful practices brought forth a man of charity, which
conclusion might seem misapplied to one who had no hesitation in
denigrating his colleagues' opinions, reporters' assumptions, and
lukewarm priests' insults to the faith and liturgy. But his oft-cited
friendship with Ruth Bader Ginsburg was no aberration. When called
upon to battle Justice Ginsburg in the forum of the Court's
adjudications, he did so. But there was a genuine love between the
two. In that sense, Scalia followed Christ's command to "love your
enemies," 71 that is, to see and know one's opponent as a person, even
though she might necessarily have to be an enemy also. Ginsburg said
of her friend, "[H]e attacked ideas, not people." 72
His charity extended to strangers. Shortly after his death,
Jeffrey A. Tucker, a businessman in the Washington area, revealed the
following vignette:
It was a spring afternoon some years ago, and he was
attending church services, sitting in a back pew,
holding his prayer book in his hands. The Mass had
ended and most people had gone. He was still saying
prayers, alone in the back pew.
He finally got up and began to walk out. There were no
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reporters, nobody watching. There was only a woman
who had been attending the same services. She had no
idea who he was. I was a bystander, and I'm certain he
didn't know I was there.
What was a bit unusual about this woman: she had
lashing sores on her face and hands. They were open
sores. There was some disease, and not just physically.
She behaved strangely, a troubled person that you meet
in large cities and quickly walk away from. A person
to avoid and certainly never touch.
For whatever reason, she walked up to Justice Scalia,
who was alone. He took her hands, though they were
full of sores. She leaned in to say something, and she
began to cry.
He held her face next to his, and she talked beneath her
tears that were now streaming down his suit. He didn't
flinch. He didn't try to get away. He just held her while
she spoke. This lasted for perhaps more than 5 minutes.
He closed his eyes while she spoke, gripping her back
with his hand.
He didn't recoil. He stood there with conviction. And
love.
There were no cameras and no other onlookers besides
myself, and he had no idea I was there.
Finally she was finished. What he said comforted her,
and she gained composure. She pulled away, ready to
go. He held her rough, sore-filled hands and had a few
final words that I could not hear. He gave her some
money.
And then she walked away.
And then he walked away, across the green grass,
toward the Supreme Court building, alone. He was
probably preparing for an afternoon of work. 73
73
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IV

Where then do we find the intersection of Antonin Scalia's
actions as a judge and as a loyal believer in the tenets of the Catholic
faith? How do we reconcile his assertions that his faith never dictated
to him a substantive outcome to a case with his personal rule "not to
separate your religious life from your intellectual life?"
It is, perhaps, in Scalia's understanding of the Catholic notion
of vocation. Scalia often stated, "There is no such thing as a Catholic
judge," just as there is no such thing as "a Catholic way to cook a
hamburger." 74 But even according to his own lights, Scalia would
have to affirm that there must be a Catholic way of cooking a
hamburger, and he sometimes did so. "No matter how good a Catholic
a short-order chef may be, for example, there is no such things as a
Catholic hamburger. Unless, of course, it is a perfectly made and
perfectly cooked hamburger." 75 Equally for Scalia, there was only a
good judge and one who was not: a faithful judge, or one who was not.
"Just as there is no Catholic way to cook a hamburger, so also is there
no Catholic way to interpret a text, analyze a historical tradition, or
discern the meaning and legitimacy of prior judicial decisions
except, of course, to do those things honestly and peifectly."76
To arrive at one's understanding of one's proper role requires
serious self-evaluation. It is not just in the Sacrament of Confession
that the Catholic must evaluate himself and own up to his frailties. It
is in all the devotions of the Church: the rosary, pilgrimages, retreats,
missions, scriptural study, days ofrecollection and in spiritual reading.
All these things Scalia did.
It is in these activities that a person develops what the Church
calls an informed conscience, that is, a conscience that has been
developed to meet ethical problems in a deeply principled way, and
not just based on intuition and feeling. One of Scalia's favorite saints,
74
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St. Thomas More, exemplified for him such an informed conscience.
Scalia recalled an earlier example of what this practice of selfexamination requires:
[In high school], one of my classmates-I remember
his name, Antonelli-volunteered some criticism of
Hamlet. Very sophomoric, of course. Fr. Matthews
looked at him with a steely glaze, and said to him in his
Boston accent, "Mister, when you read Shakespeare,
Shakespeare's not on trial, you are." I have always
thought that a very good principle useful in many areas
of life, including the law. What Shakespeare is to high
school students, a society's long-established traditions
are to the jurist. He does not judge them; he is judged
bythem. 77
Such internal exercises lead one to the practice of what the
Church calls discernment, that is, deciding what is the unique role
given to you by God in any particular stage in life, that is, what your
vocation, or your calling is. Scalia, as many of us do, had a number
of vocations: lawyer, teacher, government servant, husband (and then
father), and judge. But each successive role did not just happen to
him; he thoughtfully chose it. Discernment impels one to choose.
Once, for example, in answer to a question, Scalia wryly
homed in on the essence of the vocation of marriage. A woman once
declared to him, "Justice Scalia, you must love children." "Why do
you say that?" "Because you have so many of them." "That doesn't
show that I love children. That shows that I love my wife." 78 His
Radcliffe-educated wife Maureen had a better response: "We are both
overachievers." 79 For Antonin Scalia and Maureen Scalia, the
77
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vocation of marriage was found in the husband's loving commitment
to the wife and in the wife's loving commitment to the husband, and
through that love does life and offspring arise, which lead to the further
but derivative vocations of father and mother.
A vocation requires limits. A vocation sets boundaries. It is in
vocation that mutually respectful boundaries are set. The priest
respects the married state. The husband and wife respect their bond.
The artist respects the value of the physician, and the physician of the
accountant. And the judge of the legislator. For Antonin Scalia, the
judge who tries to become a legislator does not respect his own
vocation. As he told one audience tongue in cheek, "I don't deal with
policy-that's not my business. I gave it up when I took the veil." 80
It was in defense of his vocation a judge that Antonin Scalia
crossed swords with St. Thomas Aquinas, in front of an audience of
Dominicans, no less. 81 He reflected on Aquinas' views on the written
law and the role of the judge. He was delighted to have read what
seemed to Aquinas's affirmation of textualism: "Hence it is necessary
to judge according to the written law, else judgment would fall short
either of the natural or the positive right." 82 But Scalia's happiness
vanished in reading further:
Just as the written law does not give force to the natural
right, so neither can it diminish or annul its force,
because neither can man's will change nature . . .
Wherefore such documents are not be called, not laws,
but rather corruptions of law . . . and consequently
judgment should not be delivered according to them. 83
"Horrors!" Scalia exclaimed. "A sentiment worthy of Chief
80
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Justice Earl Warren!" 84 But there was more.
Even as unjust laws by their very nature are, either
always or for the most part, contrary to the natural
right, so too laws that are rightly established, fail in
some cases, when if they were observed they would be
contrary to the natural right. Wherefore in such cases,
judgment should be delivered, not according to the
letter of the law, but according to equity which the
lawgiver has in view. 85
"Double horrors!" Scalia exclaimed again. "Judging not by text but by
equity. A sentiment worthy of Justice William Brennan." 86
To counter Aquinas, Scalia gave examples of the deleterious
effects a non-textual decision can wreak, one being the creation of a
constitutional right to same-sex marriage. At bottom, Scalia averred,
Aquinas had his vocation, and he had his. "He knows infinitely more
about theology; but I have much more experience injudging." 87
What Scalia was trying to affirm was the self-discipline that is
required of any vocation, be it mother, or artist, or truck driver, or
teacher, or priest, or student, or theologian, or judge. Catholic
spirituality calls it detachment, detachment from the temptation of
things, even good things, which draw one away from one's vocation. 88
It was that detachment-whether it be from public policy or the natural
law-that Justice Scalia preached to his fellow justices. In sum, his
message was: the politicians have their vocation. We have ours. Do
not be what you were not called to be.
And preach it he did. He was often an irascible scold to his
peers. That's why his dissents are so enjoyable. That leads to a
critique. One might say that Scalia's weakest virtue was prudence,
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often called the "queen of the virtues," 89 which St. Thomas defined as
"right reason applied to action." 90 Sometimes, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist preached back. "Nino," he wrote Scalia after yet another
opinion criticizing Justice O'Connor's reasoning, "you are pissing off
Sandra again. Stop it." 91
For Antonin Scalia, the Court was his temple, and the
Constitution his magisterium. As Christ, in righteous anger, rid his
"father's house," of the money changers, 92 so Scalia felt called to rid
the temple of those opinions failing to honor the Constitution as it was.
"My most important function on the Supreme Court is to tell the
majority to take a walk." 93 He spoke often of the oath of office he
took to defend the Constitution of the United States. In debate,
opinion, interview, or plain conversation, for Antonin Scalia,
originalism was a moral command, an unshakable necessity to his
vocation as judge. The sovereign people had created the Constitution,
"the substance of what continues to bind us together as a people," 94
and he was without authority to subvert their will. 95
But what of St. Thomas' s moral precept: no judge may render
a decision contrary to the natural law? What if, despite the fallibility
of one's reason, despite one's tendency to translate one subjective
desires into moral imperatives, Justice Scalia was certain that a law
was violative of the natural law? What if the two magisteria-the
Constitution and the Church-were at odds? What should he do? In
such a case, Scalia would bow to St. Thomas: he would not render a
decision contrary to natural right. But only where "positive law places
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a judge in the position of being the instrument of evil." 96 Here, Justice
Scalia was calling upon a moral distinction undoubtedly schooled into
him by his Jesuit teachers: one is morally culpable of an evil only if
one formally or materially participates in its commission.
One formally participates in an evil act if one actually does it
with the requisite knowledge and intent: performing an abortion or
executing a prisoner (if that is immoral), for example. One materially
participates in an evil act if one knowingly provides the requisite
means (which are normally not evil) for the act to be carried out by
someone else. 97 This is where Scalia distinguished between the moral
effect of his decisions on abortion and on capital punishment.
In regard to abortion, all Scalia would hold is that the
Constitution allows the states the right to forbid, restrict, or permit
abortion. It is a jurisdictional issue. If a state decides to permit
abortion, that is the state's moral failing (including its voters and the
legislators), but not the judge who merely determines the jurisdictional
question in accordance with the Constitution. 98 Nor would lower court
Catholic judges materially participate in an abortion in striking down
a restrictive law under Roe v. Wade. "They merely hold ... that the
government cannot prevent that killing." 99 But capital punishment is
different.
When I sit on a Court that reviews and affirms capital
convictions, I am part of 'the machinery of death.' My
vote, when joined with at least four others, is, in most
cases, the last step that permits an execution to proceed.
I could not take part in that process if I believed what
was being done to be immoral. 100
The same would be true for lower court Catholic judges. There are
not merely providing material co-operation, but "are themselves

96

ANTONIN SCALIA SPEAKS, supra note 9, at 248.
Gerry Rauch, Formal vs. Material, NATIONAL CATHOLIC REGISTER (Jan. 11,
1998), http://www.ncregister.com/site/article/formal_vs_material.
98
The judge "[b] ears no moral guilt for the laws society has failed to enact."
Scalia, supra note 59.
99
ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 9, at 249.
100
Scalia, supra note 59.
97

90

INTER CULTURAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

decreeing death on behalf of the state." 101 No morally acute Catholic
could be a judge on a court that must decide whether a capital sentence
is to be imposed or effectuated. 102
Moreover,
I do not think it would be a good thing if American
Catholics running for legislative office had to oppose
the death penalty (most of them would not be elected);
if American Catholics running for Governor had to
promise commutation of all death sentences (most of
them would never reach the Governor's mansion); if
American Catholics were ineligible to go on the bench
in all jurisdictions imposing the death penalty; or if
American Catholics were subject to recusal when
called for jury duty in capital cases. 103
This was the reason Scalia fought so vigorously against the
new papal position on the death penalty. If a prohibition on capital
punishment were truly part ofthe "deposit of faith," he could no longer
be a servant of the Constitution and of God and still be a judge.
On another issue, Scalia was acutely aware of the moral
distinctions Catholic writers have made. Despite his sometimes
haranguing dissents, Antonin Scalia did practice a deeper prudence.
He often said, "I'm an originalist and a textualist, but I'm not a nut." 104
At other times he called himself a "faint-hearted originalist." 105 He
meant that particularly in relation to the incorporation doctrine, the
long standing view that the 14th Amendment's due process clause
somehow incorporates most of the Bill of Rights and applies them to
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the States. Many have questioned whether incorporation was the
original understanding of the drafters and ratifiers of the 14th
Amendment. Scalia had his doubts. Now ifthe original understanding
of the Constitution is a moral command, the central focus of one's
vocation, how can one justify adhering to a series of precedents that
one believes to be wrong? How Catholic is that? The answer is, very
Catholic. The Church's moral philosophers have always counseled
against creating scandal: scandal being defined as bringing into
disorder a system that, despite its imperfections, is still fundamentally
sound and upon which people depend. Here, Scalia chose to follow
St. Thomas. Even though one has a right, as St. Thomas put it, to
disobey unjust laws, one should "yield his right ... in order to avoid
scandal or disturbance." 106 Scalia believed-contrary to the views of
another originalist, Clarence Thomas-that disrupting the precedents
on incorporation would cause such a scandal, so he accepted them.
In sum, Antonin Scalia's notion of the role of a judge was
informed by his Catholic understanding of vocation. But it was
equally limited by his Catholic understanding of moral responsibility
and of the dangers of scandal.
IV

During Antonin and Maureen Scalia's honeymoon year, they
saw Robert Bolt's play, A Man for All Seasons, in London. 107 St.
Thomas More, at least Bolt's depiction of him, became a model for
Scalia, or a confirmation of Scalia's own understanding of how he
should conduct his own life. More's distinction between the laws of
God and the laws of man struck Scalia as just right. More resigned his
chancellorship because he could not affirm Henry VIII' s illegal
divorce and displacement of the Pope as the head of the Church in
England. But More was a reluctant martyr. He avoided sacrificing
himself for a cause, until there was no other moral option. Through it
all, More championed the positive law, "Man's laws, not God's." It
was the rule of law that protects all, even the most evil of men (or
106
107

AQUINAS, supra note 85, at 1-11, Q. 96, art. 4.
Scalia, supra note 51, at 107.

92

INTER CULTURAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

spirits). Scalia's law was the Constitution, a noble document, but one
which allowed men, and states, to make some kinds of bad law. Like
More, Scalia would remain the "King's (the Constitution's) good
servant" until there was no other option. And as More would resist
the importuning of his son-in-law Roper, so Antonin Scalia would
resist the importunings of causes, advocates, and justices (and popes),
who thought they had the key to the "law" the supervened the
Constitution. When it came, without escape, to a choice between
man's law and God's, then More would choose God's law, as would
Antonin Scalia, if it ever came to that. But Antonin Scalia fought to
make sure that it never did.

